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Abstract A common deflationary tendency has emerged recently in both philosophical
accounts and comparative animal studies concerned with how subjects understand the
actions of others. The suggestion emerging from both arenas is that the default
mechanism for understanding action involves only a sensitivity to the observable,
behavioural (non-mental) features of a situation. This kind of ‘smart behaviour reading’
thus suggests that, typically, predicting or explaining the behaviour of conspecifics does
not require seeing the other through the lens of mental state attribution. This paper aims
to explore and assess this deflationary move. In §1 I clarify what might be involved in a
smart behaviour reading account via looking at some concrete examples. Then in §2 I
critically assess the deflationary move, arguing that, at least in the human case, it would
in fact be a mistake to assume that our default method of action understanding proceeds
without appeal to mental state attribution. Finally in §3 I consider briefly how the
positive view proposed here relates to discussions about standard two-system models of
cognition.
When philosophers consider the so-called ‘problem of other minds’, there are a cluster
of concerns they might be interested in, including:
i. How do I know you have a mind like mine?
ii. How do I know what subjective states you enjoy?
iii. How do I predict and explain your behaviour?
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(i) is the classical Cartesian worry – the sceptical concern that nothing in the
available evidence rules out the possibility that I am surrounded by complex
automata, that I alone am minded. (ii) reflects concerns pressed by Nagel and
Shoemaker, amongst others, that the qualitative, phenomenal states had by
others might be radically different from mine and indeed might be constitu-
tionally unknowable for me. (iii), on the other hand is a much more practical
kind of worry – it asks how we manage to interact with others on a day-to-day
basis – and as such it has been a focus of investigation not only in philosophy
but also in psychology and related disciplines. In philosophy, a focus on (iii)
led to the development of theory-theory vs. simulation accounts of mindreading
and, in psychology, to related views of Autistic Spectrum Disorder as involving
a kind of ‘mindblindness’ (see Baron-Cohen 1995). Recently, however, a
different and, I want to suggest, more deflationary, answer to (iii) has emerged
across a number of fields, whereby, at least in typical cases, behaviour predic-
tion and explanation requires no access to other minds at all since it rests on
what we might call ‘smart behaviour reading’. On this model, we come to
understand and predict the behaviour of others not via seeing them through the
lens of mental state attribution but more directly, through a sensitivity to their
physical context and bodily motions.
To explore this proposal I will first (§1) clarify what might be involved in
adopting a smart behaviour reading account, in part by looking at some concrete
examples, and I will suggest that advocates of smart behaviour reading are right to
stress the role of behaviour and environmental conditions, together with an
important role for associationist learning, in this area. However I will go on to
argue (§2) that genuinely deflationary versions of the view face serious problems,
since (at least in the human case) it is only against a background of mental state
attribution that behaviour reading can actually succeed in making actions predict-
able and explicable. Finally (§3) I conclude by suggesting (contra some in this
area) that the view proposed here – whereby both mental state attribution and
behaviour reading typically have a role to play in human action understanding –
should not be construed as an instance of the now classic two-system view of
cognition (proposed by Kahneman and others).
1 Mental State Attribution vs. Smart Behaviour-Reading
Once upon a time in philosophy of mind if one talked of different accounts of how we
understand one another’s behaviour, the accounts in question would have been theory-
theory and simulation theory approaches.1 While the philosophical debate between
theory-theory versus simulation-based accounts did not, I take it, get decisively settled,
1 According to theory-theory accounts typically developed adults are in possession of a theory of mind
(something they either acquired, e.g. Gopnik andMeltzoff 1997, or have innately, e.g. Scholl and Leslie 1999).
To understand the actions of others we subsume them under the very general psychological laws of our tacit
theory, engaging in (usually) subconscious acts of inferential reasoning to predict and explain behaviour. On
the opposing, simulation-based view (e.g. Heal 1986; Gordon 1996; Goldman 2006) subjects use their own
internal planning mechanisms in an imaginative exercise; according to simulation theory understanding others
really does involve ‘putting yourself in the other person’s shoes’.
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at least some theorists came to the conclusion that a complete account of how we
understand others would probably end up involving both approaches (see, e.g.,
Goldman 2006). This idea – that our ability to understand others, and thus create and
access a social world, might be underpinned not by a single, homogenous mindreading
mechanism, but instead by multiple, distinct processes – is, to some extent I think,
echoed in recent ‘pluralist’ moves which posit multiple distinct strategies for human
action understanding. For instance, Andrews 2012 and Fiebich and Coltheart 2015
argue that there are (at least) two different ways in which subjects come to understand
the actions of others:
i) Mental state attribution: A witnesses B’s behavioural and environmental cues and
uses these to ascertain B’s mental state. A uses these attributed mental states to
predict and explain B’s behaviour. E.g.:
& Jill is wearing running clothes and appears breathless and red in the face. She is
filling a glass from the tap. A infers: Jill is thirsty and wants a drink. A predicts: Jill
will drink from the glass she is filling.
ii) Smart behaviour-reading: Awitnesses B’s behavioural and environmental cues and
predicts and explains B’s behaviour on the basis of these cues. E.g.
& Jill is wearing running clothes and appears breathless and red in the face. She is
filling a glass from the tap. This behaviour in this context makes it evident to A that
Jill will drink from the glass she is filling.
(i) captures a kind of standard folk psychological approach to action prediction
and explanation, maintaining that we come to understand another’s actions by
seeing the agent through the lens of mental state attribution; we ‘mentalise’ the
subject and take the mental states posited to underpin the action in question. (i) is
quiet on whether we engage in this mental state attribution via an explicit bit of
reasoning utilising a subject’s theory of mind or whether we come to consider the
mental states of others via the kind of imaginative exercise posited by (at least
explicit versions of) simulation theory, but however we do it, (i) claims that (at
least some) action prediction involves viewing a target as in possession of mental
states. It is far from clear, however, whether or not (ii) also makes this commit-
ment. To decide this, we need to know more about what is involved in a behaviour
reading account. Thus in §§1.i-1.iii I’ll sketch three possible versions of a behav-
iour reading account, two of which I’ll claim clearly do provide deflationary
accounts of human action understanding and one (Heyes’s ‘submentalizing’ ap-
proach) which may not.
One important point to note initially, however, is that smart behaviour-reading,
in whatever form we adopt, is not supposed to be equivalent to classic Behav-
iourism. This is for at least two reasons: first, there is no commitment to the idea
that mental states reduce to stimuli-response pairs, rather the claim is simply that
action prediction and explanation can proceed directly on the basis of sensitivity
to the behaviour of others. In this sense it is an epistemic claim about how we
come to know what someone else will do, not a metaphysical theory about what
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mental states are. Second an advocate of smart behaviour-reading, but not an
advocate of Classic Behaviourism, can accord a wealth of rich cognitive capacities
to subjects: they can allow that subjects entertain genuine mental representations
which generalise across distinct stimuli, undertake inferences, track associative
relations, and so on (the smart element of smart behaviour-reading). Thus we
should be clear that, on the smart behaviour reading model, subjects are genuine
‘cognitive creatures’ (Penn and Povinelli 2013: 75).
1.1 Embodied Versions of Smart Behaviour-Reading2
Embodied accounts of action understanding are part of a general move away from
traditional, Cartesian accounts within philosophy of mind. They hold that our
understanding of others is primarily subserved by shared motor competencies
which allow us to predict and explain behaviour directly via sensitivity to situated
action. The thought here is not so much that ‘we see the mental states of others in
their behaviour’ (as in Wittgenstein’s account of mental states like pain, see
McDowell 1978: 304) as that we normally have no need to consider the mental
states of another, as abstract representational states, at all, for engaging in an
appropriate motor resonance with that other turns out to be sufficient for action
understanding.3 As Spaulding 2012: 433 writes:
[A]ll ESC [Embodied Social Cognition] accounts hold that our capacity for social
cognition is not based on ascribing mental states to others. Rather, what underlies
our ability to understand and interact with others is the capacity for more basic,
non-mentalistic, interactive embodied practices.
Many embodied, motor-resonance accounts distinguish between primary intersub-
jectivity and secondary intersubjectivity, where the first developmental stage involves
skills such as the detection of intentional action and the recognition of emotion from
bodily states, while the latter involves the development of joint attention, such as
communicating about objects in the shared environment (Gallagher and Hutto 2007).
Yet neither stage is held to involve representation or attribution of abstract mental
states. As Hutto 2008: 51 claims, BOur primary worldly engagements are nonrepresen-
tational and do not take the form of intellectual activity .^4
2 I won’t distinguish between embodied views per se and related views which group under the ‘4e’ label,
whereby cognition is some combination of embodied, embedded, extended and enactive; see Rowlands 2010
for discussion.
3 This kind of deflationary view of behaviour reading might be thought to fit with an approach like Barsalou’s
‘perceptual symbols theory’ (2003, 2008, 2009), where the neural systems involved in thinking about a given
property are the same as the systems involved in perceiving that property.
4 Or again, as Gallagher 2001: 86 writes: B[I]n most intersubjective situations we have a direct, pragmatic
understanding of another person’s intentions because their intentions are explicitly expressed in their embodied
actions. For the most part this understanding does not require us to postulate some belief or desire that is
hidden away in the other person’s mind, since what we might reflectively or abstractly call their belief or desire
is directly expressed in their behaviour .^
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Embodied approaches to action understanding are sometimes fleshed out in terms of
an appeal to the ‘mirror neuron system’.5 Mirror neurons are neurons which fire in two
distinct conditions: when a subject δ’s and when a subject witnesses a conspecific δ-ing
(see, e.g., Gallese 2001, Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004, for discussion.). So, for
instance, it turns out that certain motor regions of my brain will be in the same state
when I reach out to grasp a glass of water and when I see you reaching out in the same
way to grasp a similar object. Many theorists have suggested that this kind of neural
mirroring within motor systems underpins action understanding: I understand that you
are grasping the glass in order to drink because your action triggers a neural state
appropriate to grasp-to-drink actions in my brain (see, e.g., Sinigaglia 2008, Gallagher
2009, Craighero 2014; for sceptical perspectives see, e.g., Borg 2007, Hickok 2008).
Yet whether we choose to spell out an embodied approach in terms of the mirror neuron
system or in some other way, it seems very likely that the cognitive mechanism in
question here will be one of associationist learning (see, e.g. Heyes 2012): what triggers
my prediction that your grasp of the cup will be followed by your moving the cup
towards your mouth is the fact that, in relevantly similar situations, I’ve most often
witnessed that kind of gesture – grasping of cup – being followed by that kind of
movement – cup towards mouth.6 What behaviour-tracking models do, it seems, is
allow for the prediction (and perhaps the explanation) of action via learnt statistical
regularities of behaviour (for this kind of account of action understanding, then, it
seems plausible to say that we predict what we have lived).7
Embodied approaches to action understanding do, then, obviate the appeal to mental
state attribution – we predict the actions of others without recourse to reasoning about
abstract mental states – and thus the approach qualifies as deflationary in the sense of
this paper. The claim is that standardly we understand and predict the actions of others
5 As a reviewer for this journal rightly pointed out, this is a contentious point and will depend on exactly what
we take to be required for an embodied approach. For instance, the kind of enactivist model preferred by Hutto
and Gallagher, which emphasises the nonrepresentational nature of thought, sits uncomfortably with mirror
neuron approaches, which preserve the idea of representation. However other forms of embodied account
apparently place less stress on this aspect (e.g. Rowlands 2010) or suggest a reconstrual rather than an outright
rejection of representations (e.g. Barsalou’s perceptual symbols theory). On these approaches, what matters to
an embodied account is recognising an essential role for the body and motor systems in underpinning thought,
of a kind which goes beyond the role accorded to the body in standard Cartesian approaches. On this latter
understanding of embodiment, then, it is open to advocates to maintain that the mirror neuron account of
action understanding provides a potential neurological basis for embodiment. Connecting embodiment with
the mirror neuron system in this way is, I think, fairly common in the literature. So, for instance, the influential
Stanford Encyclopaedia entry on embodied cognition lists the discovery of mirror neurons as one of Bfour
evocative examples of phenomena that have motivated embodied cognitive science^, while Caramazza et al.
2014 refer to the mirror neuron theory of action understanding as Bone of the most influential examples of
embodied cognition theories^.
6 For further discussion of this point, see Borg 2017a.
7 Standard folk psychological models run together explanation and prediction as two sides of the same coin
(explanation just being retrospective prediction), however, as Andrews 2012 convincingly argues this need not
be the case. We could, and perhaps should, posit different systems for each. Although I won’t pursue this point
here, it is worth noting that, although it is less obvious than its role in prediction, a behaviour reading account
could perhaps play a role in action explanation (along the lines of the factual explanations of behaviour offered
by Perner 1991, Csibra and Gergely 2007, amongst others). So, for instance, consider an explanation of the
following form: ‘Why did Karthik get out of the car?’ ‘Because he’s going into the shop’. If ‘going into the
shop’ could be read here as a description of behaviour (rather than as a teleological description) this might
count as a putative case of explanation via behaviour reading. I’m grateful to Nat Hansen and to an anonymous
referee for discussion here.
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not via some form of mindreading (mental state attribution) but via a (most probably
learnt) sensitivity to common behavioural patterns. For the most part we co-ordinate
our actions with those of others not because we view the other through the lens of
abstract symbolic states like belief and desire but rather because we have come to
associate a certain kind of behaviour in a certain kind of setting with a certain kind of
outcome.
1.2 Comparative Versions of Smart Behaviour Reading
Premack and Woodruff first explicitly posed the question ‘does the chimpanzee have a
theory of mind?’ in their classic eponymous 1978 article and a positive, though
qualified, answer to their question has recently been suggested by, amongst others,
Call and Tomassello 2008: 191 (revising the view of Tomasello and Call 1997):
In a broad construal of the phrase ‘theory of mind’…the answer to Premack and
Woodruff’s pregnant question of 30 years ago is a definite yes, chimpanzees do
have a theory of mind. But chimpanzees probably do not understand others in
terms of a fully human-like belief–desire psychology in which they appreciate
that others have mental representations of the world that drive their actions even
when those do not correspond to reality. And so in a more narrow definition of
theory of mind as an understanding of false beliefs, the answer to Premack and
Woodruff’s question might be no, they do not.
The experimental work which prompts Call and Tomasello’s qualified ‘yes’ here
involves naturalistic tasks (often involving competitive food scenarios), where chim-
panzees’ behaviour apparently demonstrates a grip on the mental states of conspecifics.
So, for instance, work by Hare et al. 2001 shows that, if a subordinate chimp X
witnesses food being hidden in a shared environment, then X will later preferentially
approach that food if they are aware that a dominant chimp Y did not see it being
hidden (e.g. because Y’s view was occluded). This seems to show that, at least in some
settings, chimpanzees are able to reason about what another subject can or can’t see,
and this constitutes, it is argued, at least some capacity for mental state attribution.
However, in a range of works, Povinelli and colleagues have objected to this
conclusion, arguing that Bcomparative researchers have consistently failed to specify
what unique causal work is being performed by nonhuman subjects’ [Theory of Mind]
system that could not have been performed by a sophisticated cognitive system
representing and reasoning about observable behaviours alone^ (Penn and Povinelli
2013: 76).8 For instance, as they point out, a mindreading explanation isn’t demanded
by experimental evidence like that given above. For although the animals could be
reasoning about what a conspecific can see (mental), they could also be basing their
behaviour on simple observable facts such as whether or not it is possible to draw an
8 Or again as Povinelli and Vonk 2004: 8–9 put the point: B[I]t must be conceded that the subject’s predictions
about the other agent’s future behaviour could be made either on the basis of a single step from knowledge
about the contingent relationships between the relevant invariant features of the agent and the agent’s
subsequent behaviour, or on the basis of multiple steps from the invariant features, to the mental state, to
the predicted behaviour. Without an analytical specification of what additional explanatory work the extra
cognitive step is doing in the latter case, there is nothing to implicate the operation of Sb + ms over Sb alone^.
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uninterrupted line from the target’s open eyes to the food source while it is being hidden
(line of gaze, non-mental). Thus, as Lurz et al. 2014: 428 put it, on this model:
[A]nimals predict the behaviour of others by means of cognitive processes that
range over nonmentalisitic representations of behavioural and environmental cues
and relations. Some of these cues and relations can be rather specific…such as
‘torso facing forward’ or ‘hair bristling’. Others can be more abstract…such as
‘threat display’, ‘orienting towards an object’ or ‘manipulating an object in the
most efficient way within the constraints of the setting’. What makes these
representations of such behavioural and environmental cues nonmentalistic is
that the animal can represent them as such without having any understanding of
the mental states that may be causing or associated with them in other agents or
themselves.
It seems that we can (somewhat roughly) formalise the argument here, which is
sometimes labelled as ‘Povinelli’s Problem’, as follows:
1. An inference by A to assign a mental state to B must take as its evidential base only
observable facts about B’s behaviour and environmental cues.9
2. Given this evidential base, an alternative explanation of A’s performance is avail-
able that appeals entirely to behavioural and environmental features.
3. Do not treat others as reasoning about mental states if a lower level explanation is
possible (parsimony).10
4. Treat non-human animals as smart behaviour readers rather than as mental state
attributers.
Povinelli’s Problem has its main home in the context of debates about primate
mindreading. However, the structure of the argument means that it could, at least in
principle, extend more widely. For instance, the Problem straightforwardly extends to
attributing reasoning about mental states to pre-verbal infants (see Baird &
Baldwin 2001, Gergely and Csibra 2003, Perner and Raffman 2005). Since pre-
verbal infants are not in a position to tell us that they are engaging in mental state
attributions, and since we can, ex hypothesi, explain all of their predictive success
9 Lurz 2011: 76 puts this step as follows: BSince mental state concepts applied to others are based on
observable facts or cues about the other agent’s behaviour or environment, A must apply the mental state
concept m to B on the grounds of some such fact or cue, about B’s behaviour or environment.^ To advertise
one conclusion of the paper in advance: I will argue that this premise about the evidential base doesn’t hold in
our own case. For human social cognition we have reason to think that the evidential base often needs to make
reference to the unobservable mental properties of the target.
10 The thought is that mental state attribution (what Dennett 1971, 1987 terms ‘second-order intentionality’) is
a more advanced skill since it requires reasoning about abstract states, like beliefs and desires. The operative
principle seems to be Lloyd Morgan’s 1894: 53 canon: BIn no case may we interpret an action as the outcome
of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which
stands lower in the psychological scale^. However, it is worth noting that Lloyd Morgan’s later statement of
the principle also makes clear that it would not support a move to a general deflationary view of human social
cognition, for he writes 1903: 59: BTo this, however, it should be added, lest the range of the principle be
misunderstood, that the canon by no means excludes the interpretation of a particular activity in terms of the
higher processes, if we already have independent evidence of the occurrence of these higher processes in the
animal under observation^. I return to the argument from parsimony in §2.iv.
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without positing mental state attribution, perhaps we should refrain from treating them
as reasoning about unobservable mental states at all and instead accord them the more
concrete skill of smart behaviour-reading. Furthermore (although we should be very
clear that this is not Povinelli’s position) it seems that we could also consider extending
the range of the argument to cover any case of putative mental state attribution where
we lack verbal testimony that the subject really is exploiting knowledge of mental
states.11 That is to say, any time a subject doesn’t provide explicit (e.g. verbal) evidence
to tell us they are engaging in mental state attribution, an application of the above
argument would tell us to analyse them as engaging in the less demanding practice of
behaviour reading instead.12 In this way, Povinelli’s Problem would apply to all
‘unreflective’ instances of adult social cognition (see Hurley & Nudds 2006, Butterfill
& Apperly 2013): although in the case of adult humans we have verbal testimony to
support the claim that they have the capacity to engage in mental state attribution, an
extended application of Povinelli’s Problem would prompt us not to posit the exercise
of this capacity unnecessarily. However widely we choose to extend the argument,
though, it is clear that the resulting view of action understanding is deflationary in the
sense outlined above: it tells us that, for any creature where we decide to apply
Povinelli’s Problem, the result will be a deflationary account of action understanding
in that creature – we will model the way in which the creature predicts (and perhaps
explains) the actions of others without any recourse by it to reasoning about unobserv-
able mental states.
1.3 The Submentalizing Approach
Finally I want to sketch a third, superficially similar approach, which we might also
think constitutes a smart behaviour reading account of action understanding, namely
the submentalizing approach championed by Cecilia Heyes (e.g. Heyes 2014), and
suggest that in fact it falls beyond the concerns of this paper. Heyes wants to challenge
the experimental evidence presented in support of the existence of implicit mentalizing
(i.e. the tacit consideration of the mental states of others) by showing that non-
mentalizing explanations of the behaviour in question (what Heyes’ calls
11 To be clear, the generalising of the Problem to adult human action prediction is not something advocated by
Povinelli and colleagues (although it is sometimes hinted at; for instance, Povinelli and Vonk 2006: 7 write
that Bit seems likely that much human social interaction is supported solely by the features of Sb that we have
just described^). Rather the extension is suggested here because the form of the argument allows it and
because taking the third premise seriously might seem to recommend a wider application: if a lower level
(non-mindreading) explanation is possible and indeed is preferable (in terms of parsimony and simplicity) in
the nonhuman realm then, the thought is, we would need a positive reason not to apply the same reasoning
where we have human action understanding in the absence of explicit evidence of mental state attribution.
What this picks up on is the thought (stressed in Halina 2015, see n.24 below) that Povinelli’s Problem has the
underlying form of a more general sceptical argument and, as such, may have a wider range than Povinelli
himself envisaged.
12 Finally, we could also choose to extend the range of the sceptical move embodied in Povinelli’s Problem
even further by arguing that verbal behaviour is just one more piece of observable action which falls short of
conclusively demonstrating mental state attribution: the fact that a subject says something like ‘John believes
that there are smarties in the tube’ does not guarantee that that subject has a thought which attributes a mental
state to John. However, for the purposes of this paper I’ll put this most radical sceptic to one side (see also Lurz
2011: 30–1 who also appeals to human language use to restrict an extended application of Povinelli’s
Problem).
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‘submentalizing explanations’) can in fact be given. These explanations appeal to
entirely domain general processes, i.e. processes that can come into play regardless
of whether the stimulus is social or asocial.
So, for instance, consider work by Samson et al. 2010 where a subject’s ability
to assess the number of dots in a subsequently presented scene was found to be
impaired when that scene involved another person (or avatar) and where only a
subset of the dots visible to the participant were visible to the avatar. Thus, if the
display showed a room containing an avatar facing the left-hand wall and the dots
in the room were arranged with two showing on the left-hand wall (so ‘seen’ by
the avatar) and one showing on the right-hand wall (so ‘unseen’ by the avatar),
participants were slower in judging that the number of dots in the room was three
(i.e. slower than they were when shown a similar scene minus the avatar). The
suggestion is then that this slowing in performance is the result of an interference
effect from unconscious reasoning about the number of dots visible to the avatar.
That is to say, although nothing in the experimental paradigm requires the participants to
reason about what the other can see, participants cannot help automatically considering
the other person’s perspective. This seems to show that implicit mentalizing occurs fast
and without conscious control. Furthermore, other experimental evidence (such as
preferential looking in false belief tasks) suggest that this skill emerges early in typically
developing infants. Implicit mentalizing thus looks like a good candidate for explanation
via a nativist, modular cognitive capacity.
However, considering this and other experimental work, Heyes suggests that
the conclusion of implicit mentalizing is too swift, since alternative
submentalizing explanations are possible. So, in an extension of Samson et al.’s
paradigm, Heyes found that the same results could be obtained from a stimulus
which replaced the avatar with a directional arrow: subjects were slower at
responding that there were three dots in a room if two of the dots were located
in front of an arrow pointing in that direction and one was not. What this seems to
show (given the plausible assumption that subjects are not assigning faux mental
states to the arrow) is that the interference effect comes simply from making some
sub-set of the dots more salient to participants (so, as Heyes 2014: 134 puts it, it is
the directional features of the avatar that are important, not its agentive features).
An explanation of the delay can thus be given in terms of entirely domain general
principles concerning salience manipulation.
Heyes’s submentalizing approach seems closely aligned with the above accounts of
smart behaviour-reading, since all three accounts are designed to show that cases which
prima facie might be thought to require mental state attribution can in fact be explained
in non-mentalized terms. Thus we might think to incorporate Heyes’s account along-
side these others. However, I think there may be reasons to resist such a move (at least
from the perspective of this paper). First, the focus of smart behaviour reading accounts
(as construed here) is on challenging the role of mindreading in predicting the actions
of others, while Heyes is interested in challenging a much wider claim, namely that
implicit mindreading is responsible for a range of effects witnessed in self-initiated
behaviour. So, for instance, in the dot experiment, participants are not trying to predict
the movements of the avatar – they are not engaging in action prediction at all – rather
they are trying to perform their own act of calculation (with putative interference from a
mindreading task). A submentalizing explanation of these kinds of cases then might
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leave untouched the cases we are really interested in here. That is to say, the possibility
that implicit mindreading isn’t involved in something like the dot experiment still
leaves open the possibility that it is involved when we are actively engaged in
predicting the actions of others.13 This relates to the above noted domain-generality
of submentalizing processes, which are not selective in terms of input and thus may be
operative whether or not a stimuli is social. This is very unlike behaviour-reading
accounts proper, which are highly domain-specific, coming into play only when a
stimuli is perceived by an agent as social.14 Finally, we should note that one of the main
thrusts of Heyes’s work is to challenge moves towards nativism by showing how
associationist learning could be responsible for the behaviour in question. However, as
I will suggest below (§3), claiming that mindreading is involved in behaviour predic-
tion and explanation doesn’t necessarily entail making any specific claims about the
status of the cognitive processes underpinning mindreading (i.e. as necessarily modular
or innate). So the approach to be advocated in this paper might be thought to cross-cut
Heyes’s concerns in ways that make it problematic to treat her submentalizing approach
as a direct target. Thus in what follows I will focus on the sort of deflationary approach
to action understanding provided by embodied accounts (§1.i) and emerging out of
comparative animal research (§1.ii).
1.4 The Role of Smart Behaviour Reading in Action Understanding
Advocates of smart behaviour reading approaches maintain that traditional
mentalising approaches vastly overestimate the prevalence of mental state attribu-
tion. For instance, consider cases of simple co-ordination (e.g. avoiding people in
corridors, or passing an object to someone) or contexts which are highly stereo-
typed (driving, purchasing items, etc.) – here they argue that we could rely on
purely non-mentalistic mechanisms, simply associating behavioural cues with
outcomes (Fiebich and Coltheart 2015: 240 call these kinds of cases ‘behaviour
expectations’).15 As Lurz et al. 2014: 446 write:
It is quite obvious that when predicting an opponent’s behaviour in a sporting
match, humans use a quick and effortless behaviour reading mechanism, and that
in highly stereotypical social interactions (e.g. ordering meals at restaurants, or
buying food at a butcher shop) humans employ behavioural rules that range over
representations of social roles and deontic rules…Also there is growing empirical
13 Without wishing to go into too much detail here, it might be objected that this point is mistaken since Heyes
does consider at least some cases of action prediction tasks. For instance, the last experiment considered in
Heyes 2014 concerns preferential looking in a false belief task, precisely the kind of experiment often taken to
show tacit perspective taking in action prediction. However, first, I think questions could be raised about the
submentalizing explanation offered for this kind of case (which is in terms of participant attention) and,
second, we might note that other tests which involve precisely the kind of ‘self-informed belief induction
variables’ which Heyes herself recommends as a good way to test for genuine perspective taking (such as
Teufel et al. 2010; see n.17 below) do seem to show evidence of implicit mentalizing in these cases.
14 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for stressing this point.
15 The idea that in such predictions the system is akin to that used for automated systems is also found in
Andrews 2012: 51: BI predict the person’s behaviour using the same reasoning as I use for the machine, by
making generalizations from past experience and knowing the target’s function^. Though note that Andrews
also argues for a greater demotion of belief/desire reasoning than is suggested in this paper (e.g. 2012: Ch.6).
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evidence that the performance of children (and adults) on social competence tasks
is sometimes controlled by behaviour-rule mechanisms rather than mindreading
mechanisms.16
We have a picture then of the default mechanism for understanding the actions of
others as resting not on some complex, inferential mental state attribution and an
application of general (perhaps innate) folk psychological rules, but rather as a direct,
unmediated (and probably learnt) response to the situated bodily behaviour of another.
So should we agree with this kind of deflationary move, allowing that the standard
mechanism for action prediction involves behaviour reading and not mindreading? In
the next section I want to argue that, at least with respect to the understanding of human
action, we should not. For even though I think some forms of action understanding do
(perhaps contra older views in the philosophy of mind) lean heavily on behavioural
contingencies and learnt associations, in general I want to suggest that we cannot hope
to understand human action without a rich background of mental state attribution.
2 Problems for Behaviour Reading Accounts of Human Action
Understanding
Contra deflationary views, I think that our basis for understanding the actions of others
cannot be construed as purely behavioural. At heart, this is because individuating the
behaviour and situations we are interested in, and determining which of potentially
many behavioural rules to apply, in itself depends on a background of mental state
attribution. Perhaps in the case of non-human primates it could turn out that purely
physical descriptions of behaviour could suffice (though in fact I think this is unlikely),
but to fix or apply the kind of rich behavioural rules that we need to predict the
behaviour of other humans, we cannot avoid attributing mental states to those others.
To see this I want to rehearse four objections, all of which (in somewhat different ways)
challenge the idea that human action understanding could be a matter of smart
behaviour reading alone.
2.1 Creation and Application of Behavioural Rules Presupposes Mental State
Attribution
Smart behaviour reading approaches neglect, I suggest, the role mental state attribution
plays both in individuating learning situations and in determining which behavioural
rules to apply post-learning. To see this, imagine that, during a learning phase (when we
16 Two points to note, however: first, Lurz et al. go on to note with apparent approval (in their n.7) suggestions
by Apperly and Butterfill that infant success on false belief tasks can be explained by their possession of
simple behavioural rules. However this suggestion apparently runs counter to Lurz et al.’s earlier claim (2014:
442) that success on false belief tasks can’t be captured by simple behavioural rules (as it is this which, for
them, is supposed to explain the fact that primates fail false belief tasks). Second, although I agree with the
overall point of the quote from Lurz et al. above, it is easy to read the quote as also implying something about
the human mental state attribution system – namely that it (unlike a behaviour reading system) is slow and
effortful. I want to deny any claim of this kind. Rather the suggestion will be that we have two systems: a
behaviour reading one and a mindreading one, and both systems are capable of acting in a quick, effortless and
automatic way, or in a slow, deliberative, conscious way. See §3 below.
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are constructing our behavioural rules via a process of associationist learning) we come
across a target B who does not eat available food in an ordinary ‘eating’ context (i.e.
where a subject who hasn’t eaten for some time is presented with available food). Is this
evidence against the behavioural rule that ‘a subject in an ‘eating’ context will typically
start to eat presented food’? Or, alternatively, is it evidence for a rule such as ‘a subject
in an ‘eating’ context when presented with food s/he doesn’t like will typically not eat
that food’? To decide this, and thus to learn the associationist lesson the situation
teaches us, it seems we need to consider the mental states of the other (i.e. whether or
not they like the food presented). Furthermore the association-based behavioural rules
we acquire are themselves extremely likely to make reference to the mental states of
targets. For instance, a simple behavioural rule such as ‘a personwho sees an animal x as
a threat will avoid x’ has the perspective of the other built in to it – to predict avoidance
behaviour it doesn’t matter whether x is or is not a genuine threat, what matters is
whether the target sees x as a threat – and this is just to consider the cognitive states of
the other. Although it is surely right that habituation to actions (in context) leads to
anticipation of the habituated outcomewhen the subject is later exposed to the same kind
of action in contexts which sufficiently resemble those encountered in the learning phase
the problem is that, first, carving up the learning phase actions in a way that will yield
statistically reliable regularities will often involve conceiving of the target under mental
state descriptions (i.e. does the target like the food? Do they recognise the seen shape as
a predator? Do they view another conspecific as rewarding or not?) and, on the other,
deciding that a current scenario is enough like one encountered during a learning phase
will itself involve judging whether the mental framework ascribed to the target is
sufficiently like the one ascribed to the agent encountered in the learning phase.
The kind of challenge envisaged here should, I think, seem familiar, for it echoes a
standard objection to Classic Behaviourism, namely that there is no individuating
typical stimuli and response pairs for human action without consideration of the mental
domain.17 Of course, the objection doesn’t carry over absolutely directly, for recall that
there is no aim of eliminating mental states in favour of stimuli-response pairs on a
smart behaviour reading view. Yet still I suggest it poses a problem for smart behaviour-
reading: if the claim of this approach is that we can understand and predict the actions
of others without any recourse to mental state attribution, then it must be that we can
characterise the evidence base for our understanding in entirely non-mental terms (this
was premise 1 of Povinelli’s Problem above). Yet on reflection this seems like a
mistake: to predict your behaviour it matters how I think you conceive of or represent
the current situation.18 Does your selection of that dish provide me with evidence that
you like ice cream? Well, only if I think that you see it as ice cream. If you eat it does
17 Thus the fact that the same objection surfaces again here might make us re-evaluate the earlier claim that
behaviour-tracking models can avoid being classed as Behaviourist accounts.
18 In this respect, see Meltzoff’s 1995 experiments with copying behaviour in children. In these experiments
children were exposed to novel toys and, in the crucial contexts, witnessed an experimenter apparently trying
but failing to perform a given action with the toy (e.g. presented with a toy containing a hook and a loop, the
experimenter mimed trying to put the loop over the hook, but in fact dropping the loop ineffectually to one
side of the toy). Children then given the toy performed not the behaviour they had actually witnessed (e.g.
picking up and dropping the loop) but the action the experimenter seemed to have been aiming at, in this case
hanging the loop successfully on the hook. Meltzoff’s suggestion is that children are able to ‘see through the
action to the intention’, highlighting the idea that what we get from witnessing the behaviour of others – what
learnt associations we acquire – often depends on how we characterise the mental states of the performer.
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that provide me with evidence that you’ll eat it again next time? Well, not if I think you
only ate it this time to be polite. Statistical or associationist learning is hugely useful for
us but it would be a mistake to think that, with respect to the behaviour of others, we
can characterise the learning situations themselves or how we later decide which learnt
rules to apply without some sort of appeal to the mental realm.19
This is not to say that every token act of action prediction must involve an explicit
mental state attribution to another. I think it is extremely plausible that, for instance, in a
game of tennis I come to predict whether an opponent is going to serve out wide rather
than down the line via sensitivity to extremely subtle, probably sub-consciously regis-
tered physical ‘tells’ on their behalf. Sensitivity to the delicate web of purely physically
described behaviour that the other displays clearly matters. But even in cases like these,
it seems the behavioural cues can only trigger my action prediction within a character-
isation of the situation that takes into account the perspective of the other: it matters, for
instance, that I view my opponent as intending to engage in a game of tennis with me
rather than intending to try and hit me with the tennis ball, etc.20 A purely physical
description of the subject and her environment, stripped of any kind of appeal to the
intentional and affective states of the other, would be, I claim, simply inadequate for
characterising the situations we encounter in ways that would either enable statistical
learning about behaviour to take place or identify which of a plethora of potentially
applicable behavioural rules one should actually apply on a given occasion.
2.2 Character- and Stereotype-Based Predictions
Models of action understanding which rely on tracking observable regularities of
behaviour run the risk of breaking down in situations where it is the individual which
is important and where the important characterisations of the individual are not
exhausted by behaviour. So consider the following examples:
a) Jill is in a maths class which has just been asked a simple question about a
calculation on the board and I’m considering whether or not Jill will raise her
hand to answer the question. Past experience tells me that, in mixed maths classes,
girls are less likely than boys to raise their hands, so I could predict that she won’t
raise her hand. But I believe that Jill is good at maths and also that she is concerned
19 That the way in which a subject conceptualises the mental states of others can affect even the most
automatic-seeming of behavioural responses may also be shown by recent experimental work. For instance (as
discussed in Jacob 2018 forthcoming), Teufel et al. 2010 exposed one set of subjects to a pair of goggles with
transparent lenses and another set of subjects to an outwardly indistinguishable pair with opaque lenses. Both
sets of subjects then watched an experimenter (face on) don one of the pairs of goggles and look around. Those
in the former group (exposed to transparent goggles only) had their gaze cued by the head movements of the
experimenter, but those in the second group (exposed to opaque goggles) did not, apparently showing that
gaze direction cued by the head movements of a conspecific depend on a background assumption that the
conspecific can see.
20 In support of this, we might note that experimental work shows that where there are small-scale identifiable
kinematic differences between actions, subjects are nevertheless unable to predict ensuing actions on the basis
of these differences alone. So for instance, in work looking at reach-to-eat versus reach-to-place, Naish et al.
2013 found that subjects witnessing just the grasp portion of a movement which was in fact either a grasp-to-
eat or a grasp-to-place were unable to predict correctly what would happen next (i.e. identify the act as the
initial stage of a grasp-to-eat, say), even though subtle kinematic differences between the kinds of gestures
were found.
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about female representation in STEM subjects. On this basis (although never
having seen her in class) I predict that she will raise her hand.
b) Karthik is wearing gym clothes, is sweating and is filling a glass with water. I recall
that last night he and I watched a TV programme which claimed that sugared water
was the best fluid to drink after strenuous exercise. Thus I predict that he will not
drink from the glass he is filling but will instead carry it to where the sugar is kept.
Obviously, these are just toy examples of genuine action prediction but what they
help draw out, I think, is that individualistic behaviour prediction often doesn’t take
place in a cognitive vacuum. Much action prediction depends on what we know about a
target’s background beliefs and desires, personality and character traits, likes and
dislikes, and the power relations and social mores in play in a given exchange.21
Furthermore, it seems that appeals to character traits, etc., do not simply reduce to
claims about behaviour (as a fully deflationary advocate of behaviour reading might
seek to maintain). For, first, character traits allow us to make predictions in novel
situations. I may never have seen Jill in class before but knowledge of her character
allows me to make a prediction about what she will do: I may have witnessed Jill being
brave in other situations, so predict that she will behave bravely in this one. Yet without
viewing her in character-based, mentalized terms (i.e. as brave), I would have no way to
group those past situations alongside this one. Secondly, it seems that we also use traits
as a useful tool in action understanding but where ascription of those traits is indepen-
dent of a target’s behaviour. For instance, work in social psychology reveals that we
often assign individuals to stereotype groups on the basis of crude surface features and
use these stereotypes to guide subsequent predictions of behavior, notably even if the
individual whose behavior is being predicted regularly fails to perform in line with the
assigned stereotype. So if a subject, A, is someone for whom gender stereotypes are
particularly salient, they may predict that a female target B will behave in a stereotyp-
ically feminine way, even if A has in fact witnessed B regularly failing to act according
to gender stereotype in the past (Andrews 2012).22 It seems then that our predictive and
explanatory practices involving character-traits and stereotypes reveal points at which
action prediction relies on something other than witnessed behavioural regularities,
looking instead to the kind of mental characteristics a target is held to possess.
2.3 Linguistic Communication
As Andrews 2012 notes, smart behaviour reading accounts will need to appeal to a
heuristic involving linguistic cues. For instance, they might posit a simple rule such as:
SAY: Targets tend to do what they say they will do.
However, it should be obvious that this heuristic will qualify for use within a non-
mentalistic account of social cognition only if it is possible for a subject to recover what a
21 This point connects to Spaulding’s 2014 objection that behaviour reading models cannot cope with
counterfactual thinking about what someone might have done in a different situation; see also de Bruin and
Kästner 2012.
22 Or again, I might consider Jill to be honest even if I know she has lied on the three previous occasions when
she’s made an assertion (for instance, if these three assertions were made to axe-wielding maniacs inquiring
about someone’s location). The point again is that individuating relevant situations for trait-attribution seems
to require a mentalized perspective on situations.
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target says they will do – the content of their communicative speech act – without
considering the mental states of the target. Yet, at least according to one highly
influential model of communication, this is not the case. Anyone who accepts a broadly
Gricean account of the nature of communicated content will hold that (on some or all
occasions) it is not possible to recover ‘what is said’ by a speaker without thinking about
what that speaker intends to convey.23 Imagine, for instance, the speaker who says, when
passing a bakery, ‘Can we stop? I’m hungry’. In the right context, the speaker is likely to
successfully imply that they want to buy something in the bakery, although they
certainly don’t directly assert this. Grasping the implicature will matter for predicting
what the target is likely to do next (go into the shop, say), but working out what someone
implies, on almost all accounts, depends on consideration of the intentional states of the
speaker: important elements of linguistic evidence then seem to depend on reasoning
about what a speaker intended to convey. Thus a simple rule like SAY seems to gloss
over a background appeal to mental states which is required in order to determine what it
is that a speaker has actually said (in the sense of what she has communicated). Once
again then the worry is that, although advocates of smart behaviour reading can give the
superficial appearance of obviating an appeal to mental states, when we push a little
harder on how we characterise or arrive at the behaviour we are interested in, what is
revealed is a background dependence on mental state attributions.
2.4 Simplicity and Parsimony
As noted in §1.ii, a core element of an argument in favour of behaviour reading
accounts involves an appeal to a simplicity or parsimony claim such as: explain data
in terms of the simplest possible cognitive endowment for a subject. However, as Elliott
Sober has argued at length (see, e.g. Sober 2009), although such a claim seems
intuitively to speak in favour of explaining action understanding (in particular amongst
non-human subjects) in terms of behaviour reading only, this intuitive appeal may not
actually be born out once we turn to consider the mechanics of theory selection in any
detail. For instance, understood as a claim about probability, the appeal to parsimony
here amounts to the claim that it is less likely that an animal possesses first and second
order intentionality (i.e. has mental states and can reason about mental states) than that
it has first order intentionality only (i.e. has mental states but does not reason about
mental states). Yet any such claim about distribution of probability needs justification
and Sober argues that this necessary justification is missing (it cannot, for instance, be
supplied by an appeal to Darwinian evolution).24
23 For a discussion of the extent of reasoning about speaker intentions in communication see Geurts and
Rubio-Fernández 2015, Borg 2016, 2017b.
24 For a further challenge to the theoretical/ methodological assumptions behind Povinelli’s Problem, see
Halina 2015. Halina objects to Povinelli’s Problem primarily on the grounds that it is a version of a general
sceptical problem known as ‘the theoretician’s dilemma’ and, as such, it imposes an evidential requirement on
claims concerning animal mindreading that advocates should not be required to meet. I agree with Halina’s
diagnosis (and I’m grateful to a reviewer for this journal for pointing me to the paper, which I wasn’t
previously aware of) and take the objections raised here to behaviour reading accounts of human action
understanding to be complimentary to her objections to behaviour reading accounts of non-human action
understanding (indeed I think it is this kind of recognition of the underlying sceptical assumptions of the
Problem which might underlie the extension of the range of the Problem from the non-human animal realm,
through infants to adult behaviour, as suggested in §1.ii).
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Furthermore, as many theorists have pointed out, the claim that behaviour reading
accounts have greater simplicity than mentalising approaches is much more controver-
sial than might initially be thought. For reasoning about mental states allows rules to be
stated at a level of generality not available to behaviour reading accounts. As Call and
Tomassello 2008: 187 note with respect to the animal literature: B[Povinelli and
colleagues] cling to the hypothesis that chimpanzees understand only surface-level
behavior (forming ‘behavioral rules’), and indeed this explanation is almost always
possible for any single experiment. But there are now in many cases multiple exper-
imental paradigms all aimed at a single psychological state – each presenting chim-
panzees with a highly novel problem – that makes the positing of learned behavioral
rules a difficult explanatory strategy.^ For while a purely behavioural approach will
need one rule for each discrete piece of behaviour (reaching for an apple in this manner
or that manner, reaching for an apple in the presence of this environmental cue or that
one, etc.), a mentalising approach can state things in ways that generalise across a range
of possible behavioural realisations (i.e. stating things simply in terms of conditional
claims such as ‘if Awants p and believes doing q is a way to get p, then ceteris paribus
A will do q’). Thus, if simplicity is a matter of ‘counting rules’, it seems highly likely
that mentalising approaches will in fact turn out to be simpler than behavioural ones.
What (2.i)-(2.iv) show, I think, is that we have good reason to resist a genuinely
deflationary approach to action understanding (at least in the human case): we cannot,
in general, explain our ability to predict and explain the actions of others on the basis of
an appeal to physically described behaviour and environmental features alone. For,
first, learning the crucial behavioural regularities themselves, and then determining
whether or not a current situation is an instance of a learnt regularity, requires
consideration of mental states (how the target conceptualises the situation, what mental
states they bring to the context). Second, behaviour-prediction in terms of character-
traits or stereotypes goes beyond merely observed behavioural regularities, since we are
sometimes willing to take a target to possess a given trait or character even if we have
not witnessed it being expressed in the majority of contexts. Third, we have good
reason to think linguistic communication involves (constitutively or in large part)
reasoning about speaker intentions, thus to allow verbal behaviour to constitute part
of our evidential base in action prediction, the system will need to incorporate
background appeal to intentional states. Fourth, claims of simplicity speak as much,
if not more, in favour of mentalised models as behaviour reading ones. Thus, while
recognising the crucial role behaviour-tracking plays in action understanding, I want to
suggest that a move to eradicate mental state attribution in favour of behaviour-tracking
as the default method for human action understanding is not, ultimately, feasible.
3 Is Action Understanding an Example of a Classic Two-System Skill?
In closing, I want briefly to consider (and reject) one possible reason why a deflationary
move in this area might have been thought attractive in the first place. For alongside a
general suspicion about symbolic representation of abstract, unobserved mental states, I
think moves towards smart behaviour reading have also been motivated by a recogni-
tion of the speed and automaticity of many of our judgements in this area (the fact that
action understanding often looks very much like a classic ‘System 1’ operation; see,
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e.g. Kahneman 2011), together with a worry that a full-blownmindreading system could
not capture these features.25 However, I want to suggest that it would be a mistake to
think that, by its nature, mental state attribution must be slow, effortful and under
conscious control. First, as adults, although we sometimes reason deliberatively about
the minds of others, on very many other occasions we proceed to quick, automatic
judgements of mental states (her grimace leads me to think that Jill doesn’t like beetroot,
his sweating leads me believe that Jack feels hot) which require no slow, conscious
reasoning. Second, the evidence of very early onset sensitivity to the mental states of
others (as displayed in preferential looking versions of false belief tasks and as required
for language acquisition) speaks in favour of a more automatic, non-reflective kind of
access to the mental states of others. Third (as Apperly and Butterfill 2009: 959 note), if
we adopt a model of communicated content which requires access to the intentional states
of speakers, the kind of access to mental states involved cannot be slow or effortful. We
typically hear the meaning of utterances as quickly and directly as we perceive anything
in our environment, thus accessing communicative intentions must be fast, automatic,
etc. Finally, as noted above, smart behaviour reading is best construed as the result of
associative learning about statistical regularities across perceived behaviour, but it is not
obvious that this kind of process is one that Kahneman himself would be happy to include
as a System 1 process, for he notes (Kahneman 2011: 36) that System 1 is not adept at
using purely statistical information, writing Kahneman 2011: 77 that BStatistical thinking
derives conclusions about individual cases from properties of categories and ensembles.
Unfortunately, System 1 does not have the capability for this kind of reasoning^.
So I want to suggest that while both statistical behaviour reading and abductive
mental state attribution have a part to play in action understanding both can be fast or
slow, effortful or easy, explicit or implicit.26 Instead of a System 1/System 2 divide
then, what I think the division marks is the different kinds of cognitive processes in
play: deductive, computational, formal processes (in statistical learning) versus
abductive, inference-to-the-best explanation, informal processes (in mental state attri-
bution). However, while these are very different kinds of thinking, I maintain that it
would be a mistake to think either process is necessarily fast or slow, conscious or
unconscious, difficult or easy. Though we are much less clear on how to model
abductive thinking, we have no reason to expect that this type of paradigmatically
human thinking must be slower or more difficult than more constrained and computa-
tionally tractable thought.27
25 For instance, this seems to motivate Fiebich and Coltheart 2015, where they aim to introduce a Bpluralistic
two-system account of social understanding that advocates the view that individuals expect, predict or explain
the behaviour of other people in everyday life in various ways^ (2015: 236) and that these ways reflect two
different systems of cognitive processing, in the sense of Kahneman 2011. So behaviour tracking is a fast,
automatic, heuristic driven process typical of System 1, while belief-desire reasoning is a slow, deliberative
System 2 process. Similarly Apperly and Butterfill 2009 posit a System 1 process which trades in
psychological-like states, such as ‘encountering’ and ‘registering’, which don’t require consideration of mental
states as such (e.g. don’t require full-blown belief-desire attribution), and which can thus meet the require-
ments of speed and automaticity.
26 This is to agree with Carruthers 2013, though he maintains that humans need not be held to utilise a
behaviour reading system in addition to a mindreading system
27 Thus the model I want to advocate here is an extension of the variety of two-system model of cognition I’ve
advocated elsewhere, see Borg 2004, 2012. The claim that mental state attribution could be fast, automatic,
etc., is rejected by Apperly and Butterfill 2009, however their argument for this claim is not absolutely
transparent (for much fuller discussion, see Jacob 2018 forthcoming).
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4 Conclusion
Advocates of behaviour reading approaches are right to think that smart behaviour
tracking – an appropriate sensitivity to the embodied actions of others – is crucial to
human action understanding. However, I’ve argued that the behaviour tracking under-
pinning action prediction cannot take place in the absence of a background of mental
state attribution: to characterise learning situations we need to know how the target
views or conceptualises the situation, and to compare a current situation to a learnt one
(and thus to apply the right behavioural rule) we need to know something about the
mental framework the target brings to the situation. Though we can, it seems, often
predict action in light of behavioural contingencies that we may not even be conscious-
ly aware of (e.g. predicting that a cyclist will pull out in front of us on the basis of sub-
conscious sensitivity to covert behavioural ‘tells’), these physically described phenom-
ena make sense to us only within a richly psychologised framework (one where we
assume that the cyclist wants to move off, believes they have room before the next car,
etc). This kind of smart behaviour reading is often (though not always) fast, effortless
and automatic, it relies on learnt associations between behaviours and outcomes, and it
provides one way in which we are able to tailor our actions to our social world. Yet, on
closer inspection, I’ve suggested that such behaviour reading in fact relies on a
background of mental state attribution, on seeing the other through the lens of classic
mental states such as beliefs and desires, as well as cognitive and affective states such
as character traits and moods. In practice, using smart behaviour reading to predict
actions, far from replacing mental state attribution in the human case, depends upon it.
However, I have argued that we should not see this role for mental state attribution as
problematic, since we have little reason to think that it is necessarily slower, more
effortful or more demanding of conscious control than other forms of understanding.
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